Abstract: Knowledge pricing is a game process between buyers and sellers. Firstly, through the analysis of multi-stage knowledge pricing, this paper reaches a conclusion that the knowledge pricing game for the first stage is an incomplete and perfect dynamic game and is a complete and perfect information dynamic game for the following stages. Secondly, this paper tries to build a knowledge-priced multi-stage game model for knowledge pricing, analyzing and studying a variety of situations. By using backward induction to solve the objective function, the paper obtains some pricing criteria for sellers when the knowledge quality is different and the rules for whether the buyers choose to buy this knowledge when the knowledge pricing is different.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, knowledge has surpassed the land, labor and capital, becoming the key resource and a new economic growth point. More and more enterprises recognized that it is important to ensure sustainable development and enhance enterprises' core competitiveness by using knowledge reasonably and keeping continual innovation.
Many domestic and foreign scholars have conducted researches on the knowledge pricing, which mainly started from cost, value and game theory [1] . Among foreign scholars, Reich measured the value of knowledge on the basis of two types of knowledge's definitions in 1994 [2] . In 2004, by means of products and work processes, Ahn assessed the contribution of knowledge to the business performance and measured the value of knowledge [3] . Among domestic scholars, Wang studied knowledge pricing from social labor and cost [4, 5] , concluding the formula of knowledge pricing. Gao used present earning value method to measure the value of knowledge [6] . Chen introduced the concept of knowledge distance. By influencing the trust relationship between buyers and sellers and knowledge distance, he used game theory to study knowledge pricing respectively from the perspective of buyer and seller [7] . Liu constructed and analyzed the game model of intellectual property transaction, then pointed out that there are five possible game results between buyers and sellers in the non-repeated game of intellectual property transactions [8] .
After the study of von Neumann and Morgenstern [9] and Nash [10, 11] , game theory rapidly became matured. Gametheory plays an important role in decision support systems and decision sciences and involves in extensive subjects like psychology, quantum computing, voting, trade, AI, pricing and so on [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . In real life, when buyers and sellers are trading knowledge, the transaction prices are the result of game. Essentially, the transaction of knowledge is a game under the premise of buyers and sellers which maximizes their own interests. In order to reduce the risk, sometimes buyers don't tend to buy the knowledge out at the first time. Purchasing it through several stages is safer. Hence, it is necessary to apply multi-stage game theory to knowledge pricing.
MODELING MULTI-STAGE GAME OF KNOWLEDGE PRICING
In the whole process of knowledge pricing, the trading activities can be regarded as a game in which participants are parties to the transaction. The entire transaction goes through quotation, concluding a transaction and other processes, which turn out to be a dynamic game. In the first pricing stage, the buyer merely knows the seller's bid, and the quality level of knowledge is unknown. While in the non-first stage, the buyer and seller know each other's decision strategies of former stages and then determine the quality of the knowledge based on the actual profit and bid of the former stages. Therefore, this model is incomplete information dynamic game in the first pricing stage and perfect information dynamic game in the non-first pricing stages. Assuming that the benefit brought by knowledge is constant in every stage, it can be further defined as totally perfect information dynamic game.
The Basic Assumption
The model is constructed as below with the following assumptions:
(1) The transaction is successful or not only depends on the buyers and sellers involving in the game, regardless of other external factors.
(2) The types of knowledge only have two cases: high quality and low quality. be the practical gain in the previous phase and
The buyer determines the type of knowledge by comparing the expected gain and the actual gain.
(4) At the beginning of each stage, the seller make decision first setting high price h P or low price l P .
(5) The buyer can't bargain and the strategies are to buy or not to buy, which are denoted by 1 a and 2 a .
(6) The efforts that seller makes to high-quality and lowquality knowledge are recorded as g C and b C and the packaging cost is p C when the seller sets high price for low quality knowledge.
(7) 1 Q and 2 Q are the net gains that measure the benefit of buyers and sellers.
The inequation means the benefit gained from buying the low quality knowledge with low price is smaller than that gained from buying the high quality knowledge with high price but still not achieves negative returns; while it is possible for buyers to earn negative profit if taking a high cost to buy low quality knowledge. As the buyer, to purchase high quality knowledge with a low price will get the highest profit, but in this situation there is the possibility that knowledge is undervalued or existing related party transactions market or benefits transfer. In the second phase, seller selects price
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according to the type of knowledge, where h stands for high price and l stands for low price.
In the third phase, the buyer does not know the type of knowledge, but knows the probability distribution of the type of knowledge p(! ) and draws on the posterior probability of the quality of knowledge ( | ) p P θ through the price P given by the seller, then decides to buy or not. Due to that the seller's price can be high or low in case of any quality of knowledge, the buyer can't only determine the level of quality of knowledge by the seller's bid, but still need collect additional information (assume that the posterior probability is available by market research and the buyer selects an action from the set A = {a 1 ,a 2 } according to this posterior probability).
The above processes are shown in the game tree in Fig.  (1) . At the brackets, the upper formulas denote the seller's benefit, and the blow denote the buyer's benefit (the same in Fig. (2) ).
Based on the above analysis, the expectations benefit of the buyer in the first stage is
The above four probabilities in sequence are the conditional probabilities of high price given to the high-quality knowledge, high price given to the low-quality knowledge, low price given to the high-quality knowledge and low price given to the low-quality knowledge. is low-quality knowledge. Consequently, the buyer will correct posterior probability ( | ) p P θ through the type of the knowledge quality and select an action from the action set 1 2 { , } A a a = according to this probability.
Similarly, the above process can be shown in Fig. (2) , the expectations benefit of the buyer in the non-first stages is
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Analysis of the Buyer
(1) The first pricing
After the seller set high price, the buyer's action is to meet the following optimization model:
E V ≥ , the buyer chooses to buy; when ( ) 0 E V < , the buyer chooses not to buy. Now discuss and analyze for these two cases:
It can be modified as the following by the constraint conditions:
That is when formula (4) is met, the buyer's expected gain is not negative. Move h P to the right hand of the inequality sign, then Fig. (2) . Game analysis for the non-first pricing stages.
When ( ) 0 E V < , in the similar way we can get:
That means in the first pricing game, if the seller set a high price, the buyer will consider whether the pricing meets ( | ) ( | )
If it does, the buyer would decide to buy the knowledge, otherwise choose not to buy.
After the seller set low price, the buyer's action needs to meet the following model:
E V ≥ , the buyer chooses to buy; when ( ) 0 E V < , the buyer chooses not to buy. high-quality, the buyer choose to buy, otherwise not to buy.
When the seller set low price, the buyer's choice should meet
Similarly, when
